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Department ofPsychology, Northwestern U iversity, Evanston, Illinois 
To the human being considered as a potential link in a communica- 
tion system are attributed constant errors, or biases, over and above 
random imperfection of performance. Th  psychological research 
literature has been searched for an inventory of recurrent bias ten- 
dencies. This review numerates twenty-one of these, in two major 
groups: those found i  the duplicatory transmission task and those 
characteristic of the reductive coding assignment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps initially the communications engineer limited himself to 
consideration of the operating characteristics of the mechanical elements 
of communication systems. But from any comprehensive perspective, 
total communication systems involve human operators at many points, 
and the performance characteristics of the human operators are as 
relevant to the over-all engineering problem as are those of the mechan- 
ical units. Appropriate to this need, both psychologists and engineers 
in the burgeoning field of "human engineering" have produced numerous 
studies of human performances in communication systems. 
To date, the bulk of these studies have focused on capacity, on fre- 
quency of error, on amount of information transmitted or lost, on degree 
of perfection. It  is the purpose of the present paper to focus attention 
on the problem of bias, distortion, or systematic error, on the kind of 
imperfect output, on any average directionality to the deviation of 
output from input. While a few psychological studies inspired by corn- 
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munication theory have dealt with this problem, for the most part the 
contents of this paper must be programmatic, and will come from older 
interests in psychology and, as applied to communication systems, will 
represent generalizations which are as yet unchecked. But before the 
cataloging of bias tendencies of human operators is undertaken, it
seems in order to treat two other topics. The first of these is an effort 
to legitimatize the conjunction of the words "systematic" and "error." 
The second is a discussion of the roles which the human unit in a corn- 
munication system occupies. 
TIlE NOTION OF SYSTEMATIC ERROR 
In the rapidly consolidating orthodoxy of analysis in the mathemati- 
cal theory of communication, the output of a communication system is 
treated in terms of two contributions, input signal and random dis- 
turbance contributed by the transmission system. The notion of error 
has been identified with the random disturbance. On the other hand, 
the connotations of the word "systematic" are such that the information 
theorist is apt to identify it with the message component of the initial 
signal. For these and other reasons, the information theorist is apt to 
reject the notion of systematic error as a useful analytic approach, 
although Chapanis (1951) has employed it in an engineering context, 
and Hake (1955), Osgood (1955), and Cronbaeh (1955) have argued for 
the expansion of the information theory perspective in this direction. 
It is felt that an expanded presentation of the problem is in order, even 
at the risk of laboring an obvious point. 
In the tradition of psychophysies, the distinction is clearly drawn 
between variable errors and constant errors. And it is on the constant 
errors that the present paper is focused. Insofar as relevant, there 
will be an attempt to relate known constant errors to the performance 
of human units in communication systems. The information theorist 
can point out that the typical constant errors of psychophysics do not 
result in a loss of information; that, except for the variable errors, all 
of the information contained in the input or stimulus can be recovered 
from the output (response, judgment, adjustment). The analogy might 
be used of a communication system involving a phonograph. If the 
turntable turns at a speed slower than that of the original recording, 
the original orchestral input may be considerably distorted in output. 
In terms of the mathematical theory of communication, however, there 
is no loss in information; the output has the full input complexity. It is 
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certainly true of certain constant errors that once known they can be 
compensated for, and that they do not reduce channel capacity. But 
they must first be known by a comparison of input with output if they 
are not to create undesirable ffects. Certainly in engineering practice 
great attention is paid to the constant distorting effects or biases of 
mechanical units of communication systems. And for systematic on- 
sideration of the human links in communication systems, a knowledge 
of constant errors would seem equally important. In part at least, the 
present survey will attempt to call attention to constant errors even 
where these do n t result in information loss as technically defined. 
A second type of systematic error, one involving selective information 
loss, can also be designated. This type might be exemplified by a person 
with red-green color blindness, who would be prone to the loss of certain 
distinctions in a visual signal, but quite adequate for others. Band- 
width limitations are but one illustration. Imperfect units in com- 
munication systems might be regarded as having unwanted filtering 
characteristics on account of the limitations of their structure. If, for 
instance, the input signal is a complex combination of sine waves but 
comes out as a square wave of just two amplitudes, this loss of detail 
might be considered under some circumstances as a desired reductive 
coding or filtering process, and under others as an undesirable rigidity 
on the part of the transmitter. Whenever human beings operate at near- 
maximum capacity, selective information loss--undesired reduction of 
message complexity--is apt to be involved, and an attempt is here 
made to summarize such knowledge as there is of the kinds of selectivity 
typically found. 
A third type of systematic error comes in when a second systematic 
signal is added to the original input in the process of transmission. 
Most transmitting units involve power sources tangential to the in- 
tended communication flow, and from these may come irrelevant addi- 
tions which are yet not random. Thus an eccentric movement of the 
turntable may add additional systematic fluctuations to the music, or 
the power source may add a sixty cycle hum. In human beings, such 
additions in the transmission assignment might be called "confabula- 
tions." 
I t  must be conceded that this effort at problem stating is exploratory. 
I t  is possible that upon thorough analysis the distinction between 
random error and systematic error, as here drawn, will be found un- 
tenable or much less sharp. Almost certainly, some of the specific biases 
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to be catalogued below are understandable as molar or cumulative 
results of random error at a more molecular level. Thus music heard at 
a distance is biased or distorted in the direction of the bass notes, 
possibly as a net result of random "thermal noise," more damaging to 
the high notes than the low. The dampening ofa wave form in transmis- 
sion might result from random disturbance, but have as a net result a 
characteristic or directional difference between output and input. In 
particular this might be the ease where a complex signal is partially 
disturbed by a noisy channel and then smoothed by a filtering process. 
On the other hand, what can practically be treated as white noise is of- 
ten, if not always, a composite of many small sources of systematic error. 
ROLES OF HUMAN BEINGS IN COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 
While a complete inventory of the possible loci which humans might 
occupy is not possible, it seems desirable to sketch out some of the 
major assignments that might be delegated to human beings. The 
biases will be roughly grouped in terms of these roles. Simplest of the 
roles which human beings occupy in communication systems is the 
duplicatory transmission assignment--the r laying of a message without 
intended change in form. Although this job is typical of those better 
handled by machines than men, its conceptual simplicity makes i ta  
good point to which to anchor our analysis of error tendencies. Next 
in simplicity is the role of translation, or transformation, i  which the 
modality of the input is changed in output, but without intended loss 
of complexity or information. More typically "human" than the dupli- 
catory and translatory transmission roles are decision-making functions. 
The simplest of these will here be called "reductive coding," reducing a
complex input signal into a simpler output language such as off-on, 
start-stop, good-bad, safe-danger, or the like. 
More complex integration and decision functions occur in situations 
where the person covers multiple input channels and has the task of 
coding the combined input into an appropriate output language. The 
person at a control ocus, with many meters to watch is in such a posi- 
rich, as is also the person in a natural situation, exposed to the full 
variety of inputs which his senses provide. Further complexity is added 
by the inclusion of multiple output channels with the dual coding 
problem of selecting channel and selecting message. Akin to these 
complex combinatorial coding tasks are those in which multiple input 
channels must be summarized, averaged, or judged in the output. An 
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analogous problem in coding a single input channel involves ummarizing 
long temporal segments of the input message into infrequent coded 
outputs. The coding process itself may vary greatly in complexity, 
sometimes involving a simple application of a threshold, or in other 
tasks involving the comparison of inputs with a continually changing 
and to be computed standard. It also seems desirable to consider mul- 
tiple-person units as parts of communication systems. The presentation 
will, however, devote most attention to the first and the third of these 
roles, to the duplicatory transmission assignment and to the reductive 
coding assignment. 
SOURCES OF AN INVENTORY OF BIASES 
It is apparent from the problem statement that the survey of biases 
proposed will overlap heavily with the traditional problem of cognitive 
bias, inherited from the critical and skeptical philosophy of the ancients, 
and continued in the present day social-psychological interest in stereo- 
typing. Francis Bacon in his Novum Organum of 1620, and earlier, pro- 
vided a preliminary inventory quite in the spirit of the present listing, 
particularly in that he focused upon the biased nature of man's knowl- 
edge processes without going to the extreme of denying the possibility 
of any knowledge or communication. He introduced his inventory of 
"idols" by comparing the mind with that mechanical transmitter~ the 
mirror: "For the mind, darkened by its covering the body, is far from 
being a flat, equal, and clear mirror that receives and reflects the rays 
without mixture, but is ra ther . . ,  an uneven mirror which imparts 
its own properties to different ob iects . . ,  and distorts and disfigures 
them" [Bacon (1853), clarified by combination from two separate 
presentations of the idols, pages 207 and 390]. Bacon's "idols of the 
tribe" and "idols of the market" are particularly appropriate to this 
endeavor. In this same spirit, philosophers' lists of logical fallacies have 
been examined for leads. The general focus on bias-tendencies under the 
name of "stereotyping" forms a modern continuation, epitomized in 
Lippmann's (1922) "Public Opinion," Allport and Postman's (1947) 
"Psychology of Rumor," and the inventory of cognitive tendencies in 
Krech and Crutchfield's (1948) influential social psychology text. Such 
sources have been consulted both for categories and illustrations. More 
important, however, have been the cumulative research traditions within 
psychology in. which attention has been paid to  systematic error, e.g., 
constant errors in psyehophysics, distortion in memory, and interviewer 
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bias in opinion polling. Needless to say, the number of bias tendencies 
reported here is much smaller than the total number encountered, and 
for three reasons: Many of the biases were inappropriate o the com- 
munication problem; many were quite specific in setting and suggested 
no generalizable rule; and through the heuristic value of attempting to 
apply them in this quasi-mechanical orientation, many could be viewed 
as equivalents. It should also be noted that the problem setting and the 
perspective on potential sources made relevant such a vast and un- 
homogeneous literature that this summary can only be regarded as a 
sampling, both of general principles and of experimental illustrations. 
At some level of scientific maturity, appropriate theory would pro- 
vide both an anticipation of the major biases, and a systematic frame- 
work for their organization. While this is not the case in the present 
paper to any striking degree, a few comments of an a pr ior i  nature seem 
in order, made from the standpoint of an eventual theory of com- 
municating and decision-making machines. 
As to the comparison of man and machine--in what has already been 
said, and in what follows, the human performance is contrasted with 
that of a machine. When this is done, it is not to deny that man is a 
machine, but rather to emphasize what k ind  of a machine man is, and 
how he differs from certain mechanisms that might be substituted for 
him in the communication network. Persuant o such an interest, 
Garvey and Mitnick (1957) have effectively contrasted human tracking 
performance with that of a specific tracking machine, finding that early 
in learning the task the human performance was like that of a one- 
integrator system with feed-forward loop, while later in learning, the 
human performed analogously to a two-integrator system. On the other 
hand, in discussing major bias tendencies in what follows, it will be 
pointed out that as certain machines are made more complexly adaptive 
to their purposes, their biases become more human. 
If the human unit is to be considered as a machine, then it becomes 
relevant to consider how the machine was designed, for what purposes, 
and how these purposes relate to the use in question. Evolutionary 
considerations lead to the expectation that no constant errors will be 
found for many human functions when employed in an environment 
ecologically typical of the evolutionary process; rather, only random 
errors will occur. Hess (1953) has illustrated this for the pecking of a 
new-hatched chick. Plastic prisms introduce a constant error, which 
the chick seems unable to correct. Natural mutations of similar effect 
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would obviously have reduced survival ikelihood, and thus be elimi- 
nated. For such processes, constant errors would only be found in 
ecologically unusual situations, and such conditions are typically in- 
volved in optical illusions, as Campbell and Kral (1958) have pointed 
out in demonstrating that parakeets are subject o a typical contrast 
illusion. Many of the uses of human beings in complex communication 
setups will be ecologically atypical in anticipatable ways. Where the 
constant errors have this origin, they will be found to be part-and- 
parcel of psychological processes of general adaptive usefulness. This 
does indeed turn out to be the case for the major errors to be enumer- 
ated. 
On the other hand, where outputs vary in cost or effort required, or 
where optimal centering of the response distribution is beyond the 
structural possibilities of the organism, constant errors may be expected 
even in ecologically typical situations. Crutchfield (1939) has shown that 
where a rat is given a hotel corridor type problem, with food on the 
sixth of ten right lead-offs of a main path, learning never proceeds to 
perfection, but the rat persistently turns too soon. While such a situation 
is ecologically atypical, it seems reasonable that such a bias might also 
exist in natural environments, ince the error of going too far is more 
costly than the one of going not far enough. 
THE DUPLICATORY TRANSMISSION ASSIGNMENT 
In this section we shall deal with psychological studies in which a 
person is presented with a stimulus and is asked to respond by dupli- 
cating that stimulus. Thus Kuhlmann (1906) started a voluminous 
research tradition in which subjects are presented with drawings and 
are later asked to draw what they have seen. Thus Henderson (1903) 
read prose passages to students, who were later to repeat hem. Wood- 
worth (1938) has summarized this literature, and from it comes a number 
of generalizable biases, many of which are confirmed by other lines of 
research. 
It should be pointed out, however, that there are certain differences 
between these tasks and the duplicatory transmission assignment as it 
might be handled by a mechanical device. Usually for the machine, 
input and output are continuous and synchronous. For human trans- 
mission a certain unit of input is presented, and this unit is then later 
reproduced. The unit may be as short as a hand signal or a word, but 
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is usually longer. Input and output are rarely going on at the same time. 
Some degree of memory is involved, however brief. This segmenting of
input, and this temporal separation of input and output is probably 
typical of human communication li ks, and even where input is con- 
tinuous, the segmenting of input and output seems to be the ease. In 
studies of this problem, the concept of the "psychological refractory 
phase" has been employed to stress this point [Telford (1931), Craik 
(19a, Sa, b), Vince (19a,8, 1949)]. Hick (1948) has made a particular 
effort to express the problem in engineering terms. The necessity of 
employing such a concept, as opposed to a continuous model, is however 
still in doubt, for example, Davis (1956, 1957). Broadbent's (1956, 
1957) demonstration of simultaneous reception through two input 
channels with segmented output, adds further depth to the problem, 
as does also Stroud's (1955) discussion of psychological time as discrete 
quantized moments. Some of the studies to be cited are based upon 
studies of perception in which the memory time involved is very brief. 
Other findings are supported mainly by studies focused initially on mere- 
cry, and may seem less appropriate to the transmission problem. In 
this sense, they are included here more as hypotheses than as established 
facts. However, principles from studies labeled perception, immediate 
memory, and long term memory, all tend to agree, the effects merely 
being stronger the more delay involved and the more ambiguous the 
stimuli. 
A second general characteristic of the human in the duplicatory 
transmission assignment may be noted. Let us suppose that we com- 
municate the content of a newspaper through an hypothetical randomly 
imperfect' teletype system, on the one hand, and through an imperfect 
human being on the other. The product of such a teletype would appear, 
to a later human unit, as bizarre, imperfect, randomly distorted, and, 
beyond a certain degree of information loss, unintelligible [e.g., Miller 
and Friedman (1957)]. But the output of the human transmission and 
memory unit, no matter what degree of information loss, is apt to appear 
to a later human unit as intelligible and usable as a base of action. This 
appearance of plausibility and comprehensibility in the output can 
accompany a total loss of the input message. Human beings as trans- 
mission units have this characteristic of rationalizing, of filling gaps, of 
providing outputs that lead to action rather than paralysis. And ac- 
companying these trends are systematic error tendencies, over and 
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above random information loss. Mechanical transmission devices em- 
ploying redundancy to remove random errors, or machines that restrict 
outputs to predetermined possible messages, would have similar biases. 
The systematic error tendencies will be numbered and listed below. 
First will come those more or less specific to the duplicatory transmission 
assignment. Then will come those, involving memory, shared by the 
duplicatory transmission assignment and the reductive coding assign- 
ment. 
A. BIASES SPECIFIC TO THE DUPLICATORY TRANSMISSION ASSIGNMENT 
1. Abbreviation, Simpli~cation, Condensation, Loss of Detail 
Output, if imperfect, will on the average be shorter, simpler, and less 
detailed than input. This most general and pervasive imperfection of 
human duplicatory transmission has been noted by many researchers, 
e.g., Henderson (1903), Crosland (1921), Bartlett (1932), Lewis (1933), 
Allport and Postman (1947), Krech and Calvin (1953), Campbell and 
Gruen (1958), and probably neglected by others only because of its 
extreme ubiquity. But if one approaches from the parallel with me- 
chanical transmission systems, the generalization is far from obvious. 
This is not the loss of random chunks of message, large or small. This is 
not the garbling of input, in which the output is as voluminous and 
complex as input, but with random substitution of erroneous content. 
Rather, there is an abbreviation of message with some retention of 
over-all form, a loss of minor detail with retention of major effects. 
While there is no intent to deny the occurrence of random error and 
unintelligible output, the point under consideration would emphasize 
the occurrence of intelligible outputs for any degree of message loss. 
The general explanation for this systematic difference from the usual 
forms of imperfect mechanical transmission emphasizes the complexity 
of the human transmitter. Studies of perception and learning clearly 
indicate the loss of input elements in a complex and haphazard fashion, 
if not strictly random. But the human operator does not produce an 
output of this type for meaningful or familiar material. Instead, through 
an anticipatory monitoring of his own intended output, he makes an 
active effort to produce a coherent output, by suppressing remembered 
detail that does not now seem to fit and by confabulating detail where 
gaps are conspicuous. Transmission thus typically involves reconstruc- 
tion. The less meaningful the material, the fewer notions the transmitter 
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has about the appropriate characteristics of the output, he more ma- 
chinelike and random will the error output appear. Thus in transmitting 
code, or series of isolated letters, the loss pattern may be machinelike. 
But even for nonsense words, evidence is available indicating that 
confabulatory filling of memory gaps is involved 
It seems appropriate to include under this heading the tendency of 
underestimating large numbers, found in the traditional "span of ap- 
prehension" experiments (Woodworth, 1938) and in more recent com- 
munication research, e.g., Garner (1951), Reese et al. (1953). The ubi- 
quitous anticipation errors might be interpreted as a part of this 
syndrome, e.g., Crutehfield (1939) and Wishner et al. (1957). 
2. Middle Message Loss 
One of the most dependable and widely applicable findings of learning 
studies can be applied to the duplicatory transmission assignment to 
predict an unrandom pattern of message loss, in which the middle 
portion of the message will be the least well retained. For this principle, 
"message" refers to the unit of input as segmented by the person in 
alternating between reception and output. The principle was demon- 
strated by Ebbinghaus in 1902 for inputs of lists of nonsense syllables, 
and has been found in rats in multiple unit mazes and for persons 
reproducing meaningful prose passages. The literature is too voluminous 
and uniform to need citing here, and can be found smnmarized in any 
standard work on learning, e.g., Woodworth (1938), Osgood (1953). For 
a recent reatment see Wishner et al. (1957). There has also been con- 
siderable interest in the relative advantage of the first portion of the 
message over the latter. On this point, the findings are much less clear, 
although in general the first portion is somewhat better etained, e.g., 
Hovland (1953), Doob (1953). 
3. Closure 
This principle of directional distortion in transmission overlaps with 
abbreviation, but is more specific, differently explained, and less well 
established in its generality. It stems from the hypothetical short- 
circuiting of brain fields as described by Gestalt psychology. If complete 
and incomplete circles are presented under brief exposures, such as 
1/~ 0 of a second, and if persons are asked to draw what they have seen, 
the output shows a strong systematic bias away from input in the 
direction of producing too many closed circles [while not the purpose 
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of the study, this conclusion is apparent in Michael (1953)]. Experi- 
ments with memory for figures with gaps as reviewed by Woodworth 
(1938) do not clearly show this effect, and the best modern studies of 
Carlson and Duncan (1955) and Lovibond (1958) find no such effect. 
Osgood (1953) presents evidence of perceptual "filling in" of wide gaps 
under conditions of low illumination and motion. In general, while not 
the universal tendency called for in Gestalt heory, it seems to be true 
as an average bias, particularly under conditions of low clarity of input. 
In some illustrations, the effect can be explained through the greater 
frequency of closed figures over open ones in past experience, and thus 
as a case of principle 7, assimilation to prior input. 
4. Symmetry, Good Figure 
Gestalt psychology also strongly predicts distortion in the direction 
of regularized, more symmetrical output. Here again, Woodworth (1938) 
provides an excellent summary of the older literature. The trend is by 
no means as universal as implied by Gestalt theory, but as a general 
average, the tendency is strongly in that direction, errors in the direction 
of greater symmetry outnumbering errors in the direction of greater 
asymmetry in every study. The interpretation of this finding need not 
necessarily be along Gestalt lines, however. The same finding would also 
be expected from the various assimilation principles to be detailed below. 
In addition, as Hochberg and McAlister (1953) and Attneave (1954, 
1955) have pointed out, symmetrical figures contain less "information" 
as quantified by mathematical communication theory than do asym- 
metrical figures of equal inear extent or volume, and from this it might 
be expected that loss of information would result, on the average, in 
greater symmetry. This possibility must be left up in the air, however, 
as it is obvious that greater symmetry does not characterize the dif- 
ference between the input and output of an imperfect mechanical 
transmitter. Here again the self-editing and smoothing aspect of human 
transmitters becomes apparent. 
5. Enhancement ofContrast, Figure-Ground Effects, Categorization 
Coming from Gestalt theory and from earlier treatments of cogni- 
tion, this principle predicts distortion of message in the direction of 
dividing the content into clear cut "entities," reducing radations both 
by exaggerating some differences and losing others. McCulloch (1951) 
has stated this as a tendency for the brain to employ digital coding, 
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"For example, the eye and the ear report the continuous variable of 
intensity by discrete impulses. . ,  but this process is carried to an 
extreme in our appreciation of the world in pairs of opposites.. ,  our 
sense organs detecting regularities the same in all aspects ave one, 
create dichotomies and decide between opposites." Wiener in "Cy- 
bernetics" (1948) comments to the same effect, and points out that a 
parallel distortion can be introduced into the information transmission 
process found in photograph developing, where certain treatments will 
exaggerate he contrast between the light and dark areas of the picture. 
Certainly such is not the typical effect of errorful mechanical trans- 
mitters, however, as "noise" typically blurs or dampens contrasts rather 
than enhances them. Clear-cut illustrations of the effect in duplicatory 
transmission situations are not readily available, although some visual 
"illusions," created by introduction of boundary lines, are partially 
appropriate, [e.g., see Osgood (1953), pp. 234-235]. Enhancement of
contrast in duplicating inputs from two overlapping roups of stimulus 
sources, such as estimating grades of two groups of classmates, has been 
derived from purely associational considerations, thus in this instance 
making the principle a part of 7 below. [See Clarke and Campbell (1955) 
and Campbell (1956).] In the present survey, we would place under 
enhancement of contrast many of the examples of "accentuation" errors 
reported in the literature, as in Bartlett (1932) and Allport and Postman 
(1967). Other instances more properly belong with the assimilation 
errors discussed below. 
6. Bias toward Central Tendency 
In the course of a series of input units varying in extremity, those 
inputs at both the high and low extreme, if transmitted imperfectly, 
will be distorted toward the mean of the series, on the average. This 
principle was developed by Hollingworth (1909) from the records of 
subjects whose task was to duplicate an arm movement of given length. 
The longer inputs tended to be underestimated, the shorter ones over- 
estimated, and this seemed to hold true for series of differing means and 
ranges. Johnson (1955) points out that this is not necessarily a systematic 
or constant error, but in most instances is an artifact of the mode of 
analysis, the effect of statistical regression when input and output are 
correlated imperfectly and both restricted to the same range. A simple 
check is to inspect he range of outputs, disregarding accuracy. If the" 
output range and variability is less than that of the input, then a central 
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tendency conservatism or range shrinking in transmission exists in its 
own right. If, as is common, output range and variability equals that 
of input, then the effect is a statistical artifact, similar to that of Galton's 
paradox: The sons of tall fathers average shorter than their fathers, 
but the fathers of tall sons average shorter than their sons. It is a product 
of the averaging of random deviations from perfect correlation, aver- 
aging in terms of input units. Thus not only do extreme inputs, when 
transmitted with error, tend to be distorted in the direction of less 
extremity, but also extreme outputs, when in error, tend to have been 
originated by inputs less extreme than the output. 
There may be, however, a central tendency bias over and above 
such regression effects. Thus in estimations of time intervals short 
periods are overestimated, long periods underestimated, as Hirsh et al. 
(1956) as well as many others have demonstrated. Watson's (1957) 
data also offer support. Brown et al. (1948) find such an effect for posi- 
tioning responses in a variety of directions. 
B. BIASES SHARED BY THE I)UPLICATORY TRANSMISSION ASSIGNMENT 
AND THE ~:~EDUCTIVE CODING ASSIGNMENT, INVOLVING MEMORY FOR 
PRIOR TRANSMISSION, ASSOCIATION, "~V[EANING," ETC. 
7. Assimilation to Prior Input 
This tendency to distort messages in the direction of identity with 
previous inputs is probably the most pervasive of the systematic biases. 
It has been rediscovered in psychological research under many different 
labels, and may be the most economical description of some of the 
more "dynamic" distortion effects listed separately later on in this 
article. It is also one of the most typically "human" error tendencies. 
The bias is clearly related to the involvement ofmemory in the human 
transmitter and would not be possible in a mechanical unit lacking 
memory. There is a crude analogy to the operation of a magnetic re- 
corder that is incompletely erased between messages and thus puts out 
a combination of present messages and past ones. But even if the basic 
source of distortion were similar, the output is not, as the human trans- 
mitter edits out the obvious garbling and turns the combination into 
an apparently single message. To a subsequent human recipient, the 
incompletely erased recorder sounds errorful and is recognizable as a 
*mixture; not so for the product of the human transmitter. 
But the major difference between the human transmitter and the 
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imperfect magnetic recorded is association. The impeI:fectly transmitted 
message is assimilated to prior messages imilar in some feature or 
other, and on the basis of the frequency of such prior messages, and 
the contingency of message lements. The various components of a 
prior message have been associated together, more strongly the more 
frequently transmitted. The occurrence of one component in a present 
message l ads to the production of the other associated components, if 
the correct signal has been lost. Co~abulatory econstruction, filling, 
etc., will be predominantly in this direction. 
While definitely a source of systematic error, this associative memory 
is at the same time a very useful feature of the human transmitter. 
Much has been made in communication theory of the useful redundancy 
of the English language which makes possible the recovery of input 
even under conditions of considerable error, e.g., Shannon and Weaver 
(1949), Chapanis (1954), Miller and Friedman (1957). Without the 
capacity to fill in or correct on the basis of frequency of association i  
past experience, this recovery would not be possible. For the time 
being, perhaps human communication u its have a monopoly on this 
capacity, although it would be possible to construct a machine for this 
purpose. Such a machine would be built to recognize word units by 
their spacing, would check each letter sequence against a stored dic- 
tionary to see if it represented a word, and if not, would correct he 
apparent error by choosing from its storage dictionary the most probable 
word, in terms of the letters transmitted and the preceding elements 
of the message. The corrected word in its context would then have to 
be further checked for conformity to rules of grammer. Such a machine 
would seem to share with the human the bias of making errors in the 
direction of assimilating the present message into the pattern of past 
ones. For interesting illustrations of the kinds of false reconstructions 
made by human rectifiers, see Chapanis (1954). Osgood and Anderson 
(1957) have provided an extensive analysis employing jointly learning 
theory and communication theory frameworks. 
This bias toward prior input, this influence of memory, meaning, and 
the like, is protean in its manifestations. On the one hand, the five sub- 
sequent principles might in a more economical list be incorporated in
it. On the other hand, it might iustifiably be further subdivided. Were 
it not for the heavy overlap and mutual involvement, we might speak 
of assimilation to prior input (1) as a function of frequency of messages 
in prior input, (2) as a function of contingencies among message elements 
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in prior inputs, and (3) as a function of similarity of present input to 
prior inputs. But to some extent hese components are always jointly 
involved. 
Note that in the communication of words, this principle implies a 
pervasive bias toward ordinary, typical, popular outputs. MeGinnies 
et al. (1952) and Rosenzweig and Postman (1957) have shown that 
under conditions of tachistoscopic visual presentation, or aural noise- 
masked presentation, incorrect guesses are typically words of a greater 
general frequency of usage than the actually presented word. The "proof- 
reader's error" is a classic illustration of this principle, as are also the 
recurrent ranscription errors in shorthand. At the level of letter se- 
quences, this provides a frequent source of typewriting errors, a person 
typing ant is more apt to make the error of typing and than he is the 
error of anz, etc. 
From the psychophysical tradition comes the constant error of 
"memory color," [e.g., Adams (1923), Bruner et al. (1951), Baker and 
MacKintosh (1955)], in which the color of objects is reported with a 
bias in the direction of the typical memory color direction for that 
object. As "color constancy" this is a tendency which the naive person 
has to overcome in learning to paint colored objects effectively, e.g., 
Thouless (1932). It is found in experimental studies of testimony as 
those of Stern (1939) in which a common error is to report events as 
consistent with the usual pattern of happenings, as far as background 
elements are concerned. In the field of verbal learning, the study of 
"intrusion errors" provides an illustration of this bias. The content of 
these erroneous reproductions are predominantly to be explained by 
prior associations. This is the only systematic feature about such errors, 
as analyzed to date, e.g., Melton and Irwin (1940),Underwood (1949, 
1951). This error tendency is probably the most frequent form of distor- 
tion reported in the studies of reproduction of line drawings and prose 
materials. Again Woodworth's (1938) review is appropriate. Such labels 
as "object assimilation" are typical. Bartlett (1932) has used such 
phrases as "rationalization" and "effort after meaning" in this regard, 
and while these phrases may sound more dramatic than the present 
principle, the facts that they summarize are essentially the same. 
In all of these data, similarity between the prior message component 
and the present message are involved. The errorful substitution i volves 
a prior message, similar and more frequent in prior inputs. The more 
similar, the more likely the substitution. In many instances, imilarity 
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can be reduced to the contingency of identical elements at a more 
molecular level of message component. Thus if we find the input "ant" 
being transmitted as"and," this could be stated as due to the similarity 
of the two words, or as due to the greater prior frequency of d than t in 
completing three letter groups beginning an-. Campbell (1956) provides 
such an analysis of similarity in an associative interpretation f a con- 
stant error. Whether or not this reduction is always possible, it is fre- 
quently convenient to deal with similarity as an independent source of 
of bias. Rothkopf (1957) makes such an analysis, showing that the fre- 
quency of erroneous ubstitution of Morse code letters for each other 
is to a very strong degree a function of similarity. 
A special aspect of this general principle occurs through giving verbal 
labels to nonverbal materials. This leads to distortion of output in the 
direction of assimilation to the verbal prototype. While this effect is 
most clearly demonstrated when labels are provided as a part of the 
input, as in the study of Carmichael et al. (1932), it also operates when 
the forms are such that the transmitter associates verbal labels with 
them, e.g, Gibson (1929), Bartlett (1932). In generM, the tendency of 
the human transmitter to employ linguistic mnemonic devices in re- 
taining and transmitting nonlinguistic material must be accounted as a 
characteristic and pervasive attribute of human transmitters. 
For the human transmitter, if not for the machine, it seems useful 
to distinguish between the novel or unique aspects of the message which 
provide the reason for its transmittal, and the other parts which consist 
of messages about the message. In various contexts these might be 
known as "identifying information," "address," "salutation," "origin," 
"destination," etc. These aspects of the total communication are apt to 
be of particular importance in determining the direction of assimilation. 
While the data available do not force one out of a straight associational 
interpretation, these effects are often described in more subjective or 
perceptual terms, as providing a "frame of reference," creating "atti- 
tudes" and "expectancies," providing a general "schema," etc., for 
example, Bartlett (1932) and Sherif (1936). 
8. Assimilation to Expected Message 
Errors in transmission will in general be in the direction of making 
output like expected input, rather than different from expected input. 
While in general, the source of expectancies will be associations devel- 
oped in prior message transmission, and hence like point 7, there are 
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possibly ways of acquiring expectancies or sets not covered irectly by 
the concept of assimilation to prior message. This point will be covered 
more fully in terms of data on coding biases, reported in the next section. 
A classic study on interviewer bias is relevant. In this study, Stanton 
and Baker (1942) had interviewers try and find out from students what 
figures had been shown on the classroom screen some weeks previously. 
The interviewers had been given various false notions as to what the 
correct answers were, and obtained biased results corresponding to their 
expectations. Wyatt and Campbell (1950) found interviewers' expecta- 
tions a stronger source of bias than interviewers' opinions in a polling 
situation. Hake (1955) has employed the concepts of subjective proba- 
bility and expectancy in an information theory setting, showing them to 
be important sources of systematic error. Again, since the prior input 
pattern is a maior source of subjective probabilities, this could be in- 
eluded under point 7 above. Hake provides an excellent discussion and 
set of references on the problem. 
9. Assimilation to Own Attitudes 
Horowitz and Horowitz (1938) and many others, as reviewed in Camp- 
bell (1950) and Hyman (1954), have shown that the human transmitter 
is prone to bias output away from input in the direction of the trans- 
mitter's own attitudes. This finding agrees with common sense, is as- 
sumed in the common law of testimony in which self-interest on the part 
of a witness can lead to discrediting of testimony, etc. The general trend 
of current interpretation is, however, in the direction of explaining these 
effects as due to the operation of some more general principle, such as 7, 
above. 
10. Assimilation to Reward and Punishment: Salience 
An imperfectly transmitted message will be distorted in the direction 
of important past messages, both rewarding and punishing past messages. 
This is clearly indicated in Zeitlin (1954) in which incorrect guesses as 
to tachistoscopically presented nonsense syllables were heavily in favor 
of those previously punished and previously rewarded, over those equally 
frequent in experience but of neutral past association. Reece (1954) and 
Brunet and Postman (1948) show similar effects. The older simpler no- 
tion of wishful distortion, leading to the suppression of messages of un- 
pleasant association, does not seem to hold up except in those situations 
where the transmitter fears the reaction of a human recipient o the 
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message itself. While these effects of motivational ssociation seem clear 
and well established, it should be noted that many of the earlier studies 
on value and need in perception are currently being interpreted as due to 
frequency of prior association, as in principle 7 above, and not to motive 
relevance per se. Postman (1953) has well summarized the evidence 
leading to his own change of views on this issue. 
11. Distortion To Please Receiver 
The human transmitter is usually in the situation of transmitting the 
message to another human being. And as a rule this relationship will 
continue in the future and has reciprocal aspects, in which the recipient 
may be able to act back on the transmitter. In this typical situation, 
the transmitter's output may be expected to deviate from input in the 
direction of pleasing the recipient, avoiding causing distress, etc. This 
will be particularly true where the recipient has important power over 
the transmitter, as in up-the-line communication i  an administrative 
hierarchy. But it also seems to be true of transient equal-status contacts 
among persons. Evidence from experimental studies in administrative 
hierarchies i not yet available, but certain studies of bias in the public 
opinion polling situation seem relevant. It has been repeatedly demon- 
strated that white interviewers get different results than do Negro 
interviewers interviewing in Negro areas. More resentment against 
segregation and against whites is expressed to Negroes, for example. 
Hyman (1954) has reviewed this literature. Robinson and Rohde (1946) 
found respondents o express less anti-Semitism to a Jewish appearing 
interviewer, or to one introducing himself with a Jewish name, than they 
did to others. While in these instances the respondents were acting more 
~s the responsible source of the message than as neutral transmitters, it 
seems reasonable to expect some such distortion even in the pure trans- 
mission situation. 
12. Assimilation to Prior Output 
In ambiguous communication situations where the transmitter does 
not get to cheek on the accuracy of his output, a bias may be expected 
in the direction of repeating prior output even if this is not the same as 
the input. Such an effect has been demonstrated byWyatt and Campbell 
(1951) in a study in which the very act of guessing at an ambiguous input 
biased subsequent guesses. Crespi (1948) and Hovland (1949) have 
demonstrated a similar "commitment" effect. The errorful correlation of 
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output with prior outputs, independent of input is documented by Hake 
(1955), as well as others. Further citations are found in point 18 below. 
THE TRANSLATION ASSIGNMENT 
The translation assignment differs from the duplicatory transmission 
assignment in that the form or modality of output differs from input. It 
differs from the reduetive coding assignment, to follow, in that there is 
no intended reduction of complexity or of information-carrying capacity. 
The translation of a message from one language to another provides an 
adequate illustration. For a mechanical analog, the translation of an 
acoustic wave pattern into a radio wave pattern might serve, although 
it should not be pressed. It will be apparent that the boundary between 
the duplieatory transmission assignment and the translation assignment 
is often vague. If the input is a spoken word and the intended output is 
the same spoken word, then clearly no translation is involved. But if 
the input is a visually presented printed word and the output "the same" 
spoken word, then in terms of a mechanical nalog one might say that 
technically translation was involved. Many of the studies cited for dup- 
lieatory transmission might thus be classified with translation. In any 
event, all of the twelve biases presented for the duplicatory transmission 
assignment could be expected to operate in translation assignments. In
addition, a further bias, point 13, might be expected. 
13. The Tendency To Make Errors in Output by Duplicating Input 
This tendency might be described as a forgetting to translate. From 
this error comes the recommendation t  control designers to make input 
signal and output task as "compatible" as possible, as Fitts and co- 
workers (Fitts and Seeger, 1953; Fitts and Deininger, 1954) have stated 
it, or "isomorphic" in the terms of Garvey and Mitnick (1955). The 
duplicatory transmission assignment is so common, however, that this 
error tendency might be regarded as a reversion to previous coding or 
transmission assignments, and as such an assimilation error, or an ex- 
ample of point 15 below. 
THE REDUCTIVE CODING PROCESS 
A ubiquitous role for human beings, and one in which some character- 
istic biases occur, is the coding of a complex input into a two-category 
or few-category output, perhaps in the form of a polar decision, as 
approach-retreat, stop-go, off-on, etc. Because information is reduced in 
the process, because the output is less complex than the input, it has here 
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been called "reductive coding." That all coding processes are reductive 
is not necessarily claimed. However, the process of coding is akin to the 
processes described in Platt's (1956) general amplifier theory. Platt 
makes clear that for any amplifier and for any neural process, the di- 
mensionality of the output is always less than the dimensionality of the 
potential input field, and that information is always lost. His emphasis 
on the "polar option" in the pulsed amplifier is particularly appropriate 
to reductive coding. 
In the mathematical theory of communication, or information theory, 
the terms encoding and decoding are frequently used for unanalyzed 
processes performed by human beings prior to and subsequent to the 
mechanical transmission under study. If the human being now be con- 
sidered as a mechanical unit in the system, to be studied in the same 
terms as the other units rather than as the "original" source or "final" 
consumer of the message, the coding itself comes under study as a process 
taking place between an input and an output, rather than something 
prior to input and subsequent to output. If the human being is only one 
of several links, whether the process be called "encoding" or "decoding" 
becomes an arbitrary matter in the choice of the reference point for 
analysis. For this reason, the unprefixed term "coding" has been used. 
From this perspective, reductive coding may be seen as a special form 
of filtering. 
14. Adaptation Level, Contrast Error, or Coding Relativism 
In coding a continuous input into a discrete step output, the human is 
subject o systematic fluctuations in coding standards, in that the cod- 
ing thresholds employed tend to be relative to recent inputs rather than 
constant for physical attributes of the stimulus. This holds true even 
where the coding assignment clearly calls for absolute coding. This 
stimulus relativism constitutes one of the oldest and most persistently 
observed illusions. The relativity of thermal judgments was used by 
Locke (1690, Book 2, Sect. 21) to illustrate the distinction between 
qualities and ideas: " . . .  the same water, at the same time, may produce 
the idea of cold by one hand, and of heat by the other; whereas it is im- 
possible that the same water, if those ideas were really in it, should be 
at the same time hot and cold . . . "  Berkeley (1713) with questionable 
logic, used it to argue the total undependability of sensory information: 
"Philonous. Is is not an absurdity to think that the same thing should 
be at the same time both cold and warm? 
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"Hylas. It is. 
"Philonous. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, 
and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an 
intermediate state: will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm 
to the other? 
"Hylas. It will. 
"Philonous. Ought we not therefore by your principles to conclude, it 
is really both cold and warm at the same time, that is, according to your 
own concession, to believe an absurdity?" 
Weber (1846) made a quantification of it one of the first achievements 
of a scientific psychology. Skin judgments of temperature are very much 
a function of the temperature the skin is momentarily used to, lower 
temperatures being experienced ascold, warmer ones as hot, the illusion 
holding even if temperature judgments in degrees centigrade are asked 
for. Similar effects are found for judgments of visual brightness, loud- 
ness of sounds, salinity of water, etc. [for example, Woodworth (1938) 
and Osgood (1953)]. Shifts in context can make a typical istener change 
his definition of middle C as much as one octave, as Campbell et al. 
(1958) have demonstrated. A shift in background color can cause a 
parakeet to stop choosing a dish-cover color which has always led to 
food in favor of a familiar one which has never been rewarded, as 
Campbell and Kral (1958) have shown. Volkmann (1951) summarizes 
a literature demonstrating similar effects for a variety of judgments 
including social ones, to which Campbell et al. (1957) have added a recent 
illustration for judgments of degree of psychopathology. 
Thus a ship's lookout, asked to report o the bridge all objects coming 
within 1000 yards, would be expected to overestimate distance and re- 
port too few objects upon leaving port, but upon approaching port after 
a long period on the open ocean, would be expected to underestimate 
distances, and to report too many obiects. Similar shifts in standards 
would be expected for human operators in all decision coding processes. 
In the psychological literature, this effect has been known under a 
variety of labels. In early psychophysics, the term "contrast error" was 
used. More recently, Helson (1947, 1948) has integrated a variety of 
such effects under the general concept of "adaptation level." Translated 
into the language of the present setting, this principle might read as 
follows: Residues of recent inputs are combined in a mean net effect 
which provides the effective reference for any coding process If the 
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general input level lowers over a substantial period of time, the coding 
thresholds will similarly lower; if the mean input level raises, coding 
thresholds will similarly raise. Helson has given quantitative treatment 
to this principle, employing for most physical input measures a logarithm 
of intensity, The quantification has not yet been extended to specifying 
the time relationships. To date also, only the effect of the mean of prior 
inputs has been considered while the range of prior inputs would also 
seem likely to be important. 
This family of errors seems in general due to the fact that the human 
sensory equipment is too complex for the task assigned it, rather than 
too simple. Take for example the brightness contrast illusions, typified 
by the inability of the human visual system to serve as a dependable 
light meter for the exposing of photographs. This feature of the visual 
system is found as far down in the vertebrate line as the fish, and is 
undoubtedly related to the fact that in the world in which visual ap- 
paratus evolved, the absolute illumination is continually shifting, so 
that the only stable means of responding consistently torelevant objects 
is through a response to relative reflectance. The mediation of this 
capacity involves numerous mechanisms, including iris contraction, 
retinal cell satiation, and input-depressing feedback from the central 
nervous system to the optic nerve. Without these, the visual system 
would presumably respond in terms of absolute nergy hitting the retina. 
As Campbell and Kral (1958) have pointed out, the new cameras which 
automatically adjust he operature in response to light intensity are not 
only more generally useful in a world of fluctuating illumination, but 
are also subject o the contrast illusion in a way which the fixed aperture 
box camera is not. 
It is undoubtedly easier to build machines like thermostats orphoto- 
electric cells that will code accurately to absolute input levels, than to 
build machines that code to adaptation level thresholds as do humans. 
And where absolute coding is wanted, the machine should be substituted 
for the man. It should be noted that for dichotomous coding, the adap- 
tation level locates the threshold around a 50-50 split, thus maximizing 
the information transfer. 
15. Assimilation to Prior Coding Assignment 
If the coding assignment is changed, there will be a general tendency 
to revert to prior coding assignments. This obvious effect is amply 
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demonstrated in studies of perseveration, egative transfer, etc., in 
learning [for example, Osgood (1953)]. Mitchell and Vince (1951) have 
demonstrated the effect for movement of machine controls. 
16. Coding Contamination from Associated Cues 
Where people are employed for coding purposes, the inputs are usually 
complex and multidimensional. If in the past, two dimensions have 
varied together, so that certain values of one have become associated 
with certain values of another, both dimensions will come to contribute 
to coding decisions. If the correlation is perfect, this association is no 
source of error. If the correlation is partial, the association becomes a
source of error for coding assignments specific to one of the dimensions. 
This error is an important component in "prejudice" or "stereotyping," 
and can be illustrated in such terms. In a study by Clarke and Campbell 
(1955), school children were asked to estimate their classmates examina- 
tion performance. In most American classrooms, Negro students on the 
average do poorer than white students, and thus in prior experience, 
skin color has an association with examination grades. This association 
biases the estimates made, leading to an underestimation f the grades 
of the Negro students in the class--a bias which would not have occurred 
had the coding been done only in terms of the "relevant" input, namely, 
the past test performance of classmates as individuals. Similar illustra- 
tions of biased coding are found in many studies of prejudice [see Camp- 
bell (1950) for a review of such studies]. While these studies are often 
given more dynamic interpretations, they seem appropriate to this 
point. 
One whole class of relevant studies have been reported under the 
heading of "prestige suggestion." In a typical study persons are asked 
to rate the value of. literary passages and are presented with both the 
passage and the author. Coding or rating is clearly contaminated by the 
attributed authorship in conformity with the author's prestige. See Coffin 
(1941) for a summary of such studies. Of course, in such studies the 
prestige of the authors comes from many sources in addition to the 
association of authorship and high quality of passages in past experi- 
ences. These other sources are covered in part by bias tendencies to be 
listed below. 
Experimental studies by Hyman (1954) and others on the effect of 
expectation on interviewer coding of responses show results which ap- 
pear to confirm this principle. In these studies interviewers were asked 
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to code responses from recorded interviews. EquivMent responses im- 
bedded in a generally isolationist recording and in a generally interven- 
tionist recording tended to be coded in a biased fashion, distorting the 
the specific response in the direction of the general tone of the interview 
or in the direction of the speaker's answers to previous questions. 
The coding of syllogistic onclusions into "valid" and "invalid" show 
systematic biases in which the general "atmosphere" as negative or 
positive, contaminates the evaluation of validity, as Woodworth and 
Sells (1935) have shown. Still more prevalent is the contamination of
the judgment of syllogistic validity with the extrinsic truth of the con- 
clusion as the judge sees it [e.g., Janis and Frick (1943), Morgan and 
Morton (19440, and Thistlethwaite (1950)]. 
The effect of associated cues as cited so far has been to induce assimi- 
lation errors, in the language of older studies of illusions. In other words, 
the error has been to distort the coding so that the response goes along 
with the associated cue, the effect being the greater the more ambiguous 
the relevant input dimension. In some studies, the systematic error seems 
to be of an opposite nature, resulting in a contrast error. Thus in the 
study of weight illusion by Brunswik and Herma (1951), position (i.e., 
left position or right position) was associated with heaviness, resulting 
in an exaggeration of the heaviness of a heavy weight when it appeared 
on the usually lighter side. Thus in expei'ience, height and width of men 
are correlated, leading to a contrast illusion in which of two men both 
equal in height, the thinner appears the taller. Watson (1957) has shown 
the effect for size judgments in distinctive series. The conditions under 
which associated cues lead to assimilation or contrast errors are not well 
understood. In general, principles of learning predict assimilation errors, 
and these errors are probably most frequent in studies of bias. 
17. Assimilation to Evaluative Coding. 
There is a tendency to distort coding assignments in the direction of 
an affeetive or evaluative coding. The most natural coding of any input 
by the human operator seems to be of the general nature of "like" versus 
"dislike," "approach" versus "avoid," "good" versus "bad," "beauti- 
ful" versus "ugly," etc. The general finding of psychologists is that 
whatever assignment is given tends to be distorted in the direction of 
this evaluative assignment. This is shown repeatedly as a "halo" effect, 
or general factor in rating assignments. Guilford (1954) has summarized 
such studies. It has also been noted as a tendency toward two-valued 
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logic. It seems appropriate to the basic role of adient and abient motives 
in all animal earning. Thus assignments tojudge other persons in terms 
of intelligence, honesty, etc. are distorted in the direction of a liking- 
disliking code. This error tendency seems to go with complex inputs and 
to involve a confounding of coding with irrelevant input aspects, as in 
the previous principle. 
18. Miscellaneous Coding Biases, "Population Stereotypes," "Response 
sets" 
In engineering psychology, numerous specific biases common to people 
in general have been discovered, and have been given the collective 
label of "population stereotypes" by Fitts (1951). Many of these could 
be included under "reversion to prior coding assignment," such as errors 
due to familiarity with scales reading in increasing magnitude from left 
to right, number-space-direction codi g habits developed from experience 
with clock faces, etc. Others have no obviously associative basis, as the 
preference for readings of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 in interpolating in scale read- 
ing. 
Related, perhaps, are some of the findings on response bias in tests 
and questionnaires. Blankenship (1940) and other studies seem to in- 
dicate that in coding statements in terms of agree and disagree, there is 
a general bias in favor of the agreement. Whitfield (1950), using an 
"imaginary" questionaire in which students were asked preferences be- 
tween unknown alternatives in the form "Do you prefer - -  to 
- - ? "  found 85 % using "yes" on the first "item" and a preponder- 
ance of "yes" on all items. 
Berg and Rapaport (1954) in a similar task found 51% choosing 
"yes," 25 % "no", and 24t% "undecided," and similar patterns favoring 
"agree" (versus "disagree" and "undecided"), "true (versus "false"), 
"first" (versus "second" and "third"), "X" (versus "Y"), "satisfied" 
(versus "very satisfied," dissatisfied," and "very dissatisfied"), "3" 
(versus "1," "2," "4"), and "B" (versus "A," "C," and "D"). Whitfield 
(1950) found the frequency of long runs of the same answer (e.g., "yes" 
or "no") to be less frequent than chance, in agreement with Goodfellow 
(1938) and Jarvik (1951). On the other hand, in situations where the 
subieet has to select among many alternatives (Fagan and North, 1951) 
or to report awareness ornonawareness of a stimulus which is presumably 
present in some degree on each occasion, somewhat the opposite ffect 
occurs, with subjects more likely than not to repeat a previously made 
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response, autocorrelations for adjacent responses on the order of 0.30, 
and positive for lags up to 10 responses, in Ho~varth's (1956) data. This 
positive autocorrelation has been repeatedly found in recent researches, 
which are numerous enough to justify a separat e review. A central 
controversy--perhaps involving a nonoperational distinction-- is as to 
whether these dependencies represent a response bias or a more "real" 
fluctuation i  sensory threshold. For introductions to this mushrooming 
literature see Neisser (1957), Conkiin and Sampson (1956), Day (I956, 
1957), and Collier and Verplanck (1958). Belbin and Cane (1956) have 
attempted to relate a bias toward setting the discrimination threshold 
near 50-50, etc., to an adaptation-level phenomenon, asdescribed under 
point 14 above. Such a "bias" serves to maximize information transmis- 
sion in many situations. The ease for strong and consistent individual 
differences in such response biases has been frequently made, especially 
by Cronbach (1946, 1950). 
SYSTEMATIC ERRORS IN MORE COMPLEX ASSIGNMENTS 
Potentially, the most useful part of a survey such as the present one 
would be the citation of the biases in the more complex integrative and 
decision processes in which people are most typically employed. One is 
reminded of Bachem's (1952) discussion of "astigmatism of the brain," 
and of discussions such as Weinberg's (1951) of chess-playing machines 
subject o imperfections such as over valuation of recent experience, to 
"easy prejudice and quick dismay," etc. The exploration of this area is, 
however, at a very imperfect stage. 
Some of the principles that apply in this area are ones already discussed 
for the simpler assignments. Thus discussion of problem solving, as by 
Dunker (1945), Katona (1940), and Luchins (1942), all emphasize the 
bias introduced by set, previous experience, habit, or expectation based 
on past solutions, as in points 7, 8, and 17 above. These Gestalt psychol- 
ogists also emphasize the force of perceptual organizational factors in 
creating simple Gestalten which are hard to break and which thus bias 
solutions, principles already touched upon, as 3 and 4 above. A renewed 
interest in problem solving may be expected to contribute more knowl- 
edge of systematic error tendencies in the future. 
19. Overdependence upon Single Input Sources 
Smedslund (1955) has undertaken a promising series of researches 
which, in the language of this report, represent a multiple imperfect in- 
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put, single integrative output assignment. His focus has been on degree 
of achievement, but he presents his data in such form that it is possible 
to infer some systematic biases, although the data are not yet definitive. 
Although all of five input dimensions contribute some valid knowledge, 
the average person performs no better than if he had the single best 
source available. There is a strong tendency toward overdependenee on 
a single source and neglect of all other sources. This one source is usually 
the most valid one, but not necessarily so. It  seems probable that certain 
types of easily coded inputs may acquire a spurious dominance in the 
combinatorial process. Heidbreder (1945) for instance, has proposed that 
for human cognition there is a bias toward the concrete thinglike aspects 
of input, and a slowness in using the more abstract aspects. 
20. Assimilation to Other Channels 
The human operator, like the coaxial cable, is often engaged as a link 
in several separate communication lines at once. In such situations a 
common systematic error would seem to be like the mixing of messages 
from the separate channels. Thus it is said that one of the reasons for 
apparent clairvoyance in some studies was the fact that the experimenter 
had to record both the turned card and the subject's guess, and if errors 
were made, these were in the direction of reporting both to be the same. 
In other instances, there are available to the transmitter many input 
channels, but his task is to transmit only one, the others operating as 
distractors. In such instances, the systematic error is in the direction of 
the irrelevant messages. Older studies summarized by Woodworth 
(1938) on doing two things at once confirm the tendency to mix channel 
content. Recent studies on the problem, as by Broadbent (1952, 1956, 
1957), Mobray (1953), Poulton (1956) and Egan et al. (1954), have not 
reported specifically on the kinds of errors made, but by implication 
they are of this type. 
MULTIPLE PERSON UNITS IN COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
In the classic studies of Bartlett (1932) and in their repetition by All- 
port and Postman (1947), messages are studied as they are distorted 
through a chain of person-to-person communications. These studies how 
the same error tendencies found for individual human units, as sum- 
marized in the section on duplieatory transmission above. The situation 
involves, after all, only a cumulation of individual processes. 
In other settings, however, human beings perform as groups, or operate 
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as parallel units with interaction tangential to the stream of communica- 
tion. In such settings it is possible that error tendencies arise in addition 
to those characteristic of single individuals. One such bias tendency is
offered here. 
21. Conformity, Pseudoconfirmation 
When a group of persons are exposed to the same input and are asked 
to transmit or code it, if they are in communication among themselves 
or in a position to hear each other's outputs, they will distort their in- 
dividual outputs in the direction of conformity with those of their 
fellows. If the engineer has posted multiple lookouts or otherwise m- 
ployed multiple human observers and transmitters for the purpose of 
increasing the validity of his information, he may take the concensus as 
confirmatory. If the multiple human observers have been in communica- 
tion with each other, we may call this "pseudoconfirmation," as such 
consensus can be obtained on the most worthless of reports. 
The general characteristic of human beings involved is the best 
established principle Of experimental social psychology, going back to 
the beginning of the field, as in the studies of Bridges (1914) and Moore 
(1921). The principle is also the most common feature of current group- 
dynamics research. The experiment ofSherif (1936) is appropriate to the 
present setting. Persons in a dark room were asked to report on the 
number of inches which a dot of light moved, and after experience in re- 
porting together, developed great consensus about the distance moved, 
under conditions in which any movement of the dot was illusory. More 
recently Asch (1952) has obtained falsification of reports on the relative 
length of two lines under pressure of group conformity. 
Groups are often employed at a coding or decision making part of a 
communication system, on grounds of some implied superiority. It 
might be thought hat group functioning would operate to eliminate 
both random errors and systematic biases. The answer is clear on random 
errors: Groups are superior to single individuals, but not to averages of 
single individuals involving the same numbers of persons, as shown by 
Stroop (1932), Moore and Anderson (1954) and Taylor et al. (1957). 
The group operates like an arithmetic ombination of individuals in 
reducing random errors. [Senders' (1955) finding that pooling the re- 
sponses of several observers reduces transmission is judged to be a 
product of the application of information theory without regard for the 
establishment of a "correct" code or desired output.] There is no good 
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evidence that pooling observers reduces ystematic bias, and in some 
instances it has not, as in Preston's (1938) study. 
Bavelas (1953) has initiated a fertile program of research on the rela- 
tive effectiveness of various communication linkages among persons 
engaged in collective decision making. While to date these studies have 
focused on efficiency, there is potentially a valuable field of research on 
the specific kinds of errors that are typical for each of the communica- 
tion patterns. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Although both patently incomplete and tediously detailed, it is hoped 
that this inventory of biases may be both useful as a preliminary check- 
list, and provocative of integrative theoretical efforts. While throughout 
the listing there has been an effort o call attention to overlap among the 
separately enumerated principles, one still reads them with the suspicion 
that fairly near the surface there lies available a more elegant and 
economical organization with greater theoretical relevance. So far, this 
goal has eluded the reviewer's grasp. But perhaps there are theoretical 
reasons why this simplicity should not even be expected. From the 
perspective of evolutionary theory, one can see man designed as a 
compromise among an almost infinite number of recurrent environmental 
exigencies. Paralleling this heterogeneity of environmental demands i a 
heterogeneity of semidiscrete organs and servosystems, reflected in 
man's anatomical complexity. From the evolutionary perspective on 
structural-functional relationships, we would expect man's functioning 
to be, at very least, as complex as the anatomical differentiation, and to 
date we have no theories of perception and learning that in their com- 
plexity do justice to the complexity of the anatomy of the brain. When 
the complexity of human structure and function is paired with the 
heterogeneity of novel assignments with which modern technology faces 
man, the multiplicity of opportunities for biased performance becomes 
innumerable. Perhaps it should be surprising that any, or so many, 
ubiquitous bias tendencies have been found. 
Our nostalgia for simple and elegant theory has been ~ major moti~:~ 
in scientific advance, but it will also frequently be misapplied, a~ 
evolutionary considerations may indicate that it is not to be expected 
in descriptions of organismic function. This nostalgia can operate as a 
bias, as indicated in points 1 and 4 above and in the very first of Francis 
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Bacon's  l ist of idols of the tr ibe:  "The  human understanding,  from its 
pecul iar  nature,  easi ly supposes a greater  degree of order and equal i ty  
in things than it  real ly  f inds." 
RECEIVED: March  10, 1958. 
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